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DORA and DMARC for EU Financial Entities

DMARC AI editorial team · Last updated

DORA never names DMARC, but its ICT risk and third-party rules make email authentication evidence relevant. Which articles apply and what MSPs should show.

01

Introduction

DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, does not mention DMARC, SPF, DKIM or even email. What it does require of EU financial entities, since 17 January 2025, is a documented ICT risk management framework, protection of the authenticity and integrity of data, anomaly detection, change control and managed ICT third-party risk. DMARC evidence is one practical way to show several of those controls exist for email domains.

This page is the DORA-specific companion to our article on DMARC for financial services, which covers the fraud case, and to the NIS2 and DMARC series. It maps DORA articles to email authentication precisely, without claiming more than the text says, and lists what an MSP serving financial entities should be able to show. For the protocol itself, see the DMARC guide.

This is not legal advice. Whether and how DORA applies to a specific firm is a question for that firm and its compliance or legal advisers.

02

Key takeaways

  • DORA and its RTS on ICT risk management (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774) never name DMARC, SPF, DKIM or email. Nobody can honestly say "DORA requires DMARC".
  • Several obligations make email authentication evidence relevant: Article 9 (protection and prevention, including authenticity and integrity of data and change management), Article 10 (detection), Article 8 (asset identification) and Articles 28 to 30 (ICT third-party risk and contracts).
  • An MSP that manages a financial entity's domains, DNS or mail platform is an ICT third-party service provider under DORA's definition, so its work falls inside the client's third-party risk framework and register of information.
  • Useful evidence per domain: the published DMARC policy and its history, proof that aggregate reports are received and reviewed, a sender inventory, and change records for DNS edits.
  • For financial entities in scope of both, DORA is lex specialis to NIS2. An MSP may still have NIS2 obligations of its own.
03

Does DORA require DMARC?

No. Neither Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 nor the regulatory technical standards that supplement it name DMARC, SPF, DKIM, phishing or email. DORA is written in technology-neutral terms: it sets outcomes such as protecting the authenticity and integrity of data and detecting anomalous activity, and leaves the choice of controls to the financial entity, applied in proportion to its size and risk profile (Article 4).

That matters in two directions. Nobody should present DMARC as a named DORA requirement, and nobody should conclude that email is out of scope. A spoofed message using the entity's own domain is an attack on the authenticity of data the entity sends, which is exactly the kind of risk the framework has to address. DMARC at enforcement is a widely used, standards-based control for that risk, defined in RFC 9989 (which obsoleted RFC 7489).

04

Which DORA articles make email authentication relevant?

Five groups of provisions do the work: the ICT risk management framework and asset identification (Articles 6 and 8), protection and prevention (Article 9), detection (Article 10), learning and awareness (Article 13), and ICT third-party risk (Articles 28 to 30). The table maps each to email authentication evidence. Article references are to the official text on EUR-Lex.

DORA provision What the text requires (paraphrased) Why DMARC evidence is relevant
Art. 5(2) The management body defines, approves, oversees and is responsible for the ICT risk management framework Enforced DMARC is a concrete, reportable control the board can approve
Art. 6(1) A sound, comprehensive and well-documented ICT risk management framework Email domains and their authentication need to appear in it
Art. 8(1) and 8(4) Identify, classify and document ICT supported business functions and all information and ICT assets Sending domains and the services that send for them are assets to inventory
Art. 9(3)(c) ICT solutions that prevent impairment of the authenticity and integrity of data DMARC, SPF and DKIM let receivers reject mail that falsely claims the entity's domain
Art. 9(4)(e) Documented ICT change management so that changes are recorded, tested, assessed, approved, implemented and verified DNS changes to DMARC, SPF and DKIM records are ICT changes
Art. 10(1) Mechanisms to promptly detect anomalous activities Aggregate reports show unknown sources sending as the domain
Art. 13(6) ICT security awareness programmes and training Staff awareness of spoofing complements technical controls
Art. 28 to 30 Manage ICT third-party risk, keep a register of contractual arrangements, include key contractual provisions MSPs and sending platforms are ICT third-party service providers

Article 9(4)(d) also asks for "strong authentication mechanisms", but in context that concerns access to systems and cryptographic key protection, not email sender authentication. It is better not to cite it as a DMARC hook.

05

What does the RTS on ICT risk management add?

The detail sits in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, adopted on 13 March 2024, which specifies ICT risk management tools, methods, processes and policies and a simplified framework for certain smaller entities. Like DORA, it does not mention email or DNS, but several of its articles describe controls that DMARC evidence supports.

The articles most relevant to email authentication, from the RTS text on EUR-Lex:

  • Article 4, ICT asset management policy: the inventory records a unique identifier, location, owner and supported business functions for each ICT asset. A sending domain and the platforms authorised to send for it fit naturally here.
  • Article 12, Logging: identify events to be logged and protect logs against tampering and deletion. Archived aggregate reports and DNS change logs are logs in this sense.
  • Article 13, Network security management: segregation of networks and the identification and specification of security measures for network services.
  • Article 14, Securing information in transit: protect the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of data during network transmission. Email is data in transit, and sender authentication addresses its authenticity.
  • Article 17, ICT change management: documentation and communication of change details, which covers edits to DNS authentication records.
  • Article 23, Anomalous activities detection: identify anomalous activity and generate alerts, with indications of possible malicious activity as one criterion for incident response. A sudden volume of failing mail from unknown IPs in aggregate reports is such an indication.

Smaller financial entities eligible for the simplified framework follow Title III of the same RTS instead, which covers similar ground in lighter form.

06

Is an MSP an ICT third-party service provider under DORA?

Usually yes. Article 3(19) defines an ICT third-party service provider as an undertaking providing ICT services, and Article 3(21) defines ICT services broadly as digital and data services provided through ICT systems on an ongoing basis. An MSP that manages a financial entity's DNS, mail platform or DMARC monitoring provides exactly that.

The consequences come from the financial entity's side:

  1. The entity stays fully responsible. Article 28(1)(a) says financial entities remain fully responsible for compliance with DORA when they use ICT third-party services. Outsourcing DMARC does not outsource the obligation.
  2. The arrangement goes in the register. Article 28(3) requires a register of information on all contractual arrangements for ICT services, reported to the competent authority. The templates are set by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2956.
  3. Due diligence before contracting. Article 28(4) requires an assessment before entering an arrangement, and Article 28(5) limits contracting to providers that meet appropriate information security standards.
  4. Contract content is prescribed. Article 30 lists what the written contract must contain.

If the service supports a critical or important function, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1773 sets out what the entity's policy on such contractual arrangements must contain. Whether email sending or DNS supports a critical or important function is the financial entity's assessment, not the MSP's.

07

What does Article 30 mean for an MSP's DMARC contract?

Article 30(2) lists provisions every ICT services contract must include, and several translate directly into a DMARC or DNS service. Article 30(3) adds stricter terms where the service supports a critical or important function. The MSP should expect these in the client's contract template rather than offering its own.

Article 30(2) items that most often shape a DMARC service:

  • (a) A clear and complete description of the services, and whether subcontracting is allowed. Name the domains, the DNS hosts and any DMARC reporting platform used as a subprocessor.
  • (b) Locations where services are provided and data is processed. Aggregate reports contain sending IPs and domains, so state where they are stored.
  • (c) Provisions on availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of data.
  • (f) Assistance during ICT incidents, at no additional cost or a cost agreed in advance.
  • (g) Full cooperation with competent and resolution authorities.
  • (i) Participation in the entity's ICT security awareness and digital operational resilience training.

Under Article 30(3), for critical or important functions, the contract also needs measurable service levels, notice duties, security measures, unrestricted rights of access, inspection and audit, and an exit strategy. For a DMARC service, the exit part is practical: the entity must be able to take over its DNS records and report archive. How MSPs scope DMARC in MSA and SOW templates and tenant offboarding cover how to write and run that.

08

What should an MSP be able to evidence for each domain?

Evidence that a control exists, works and is maintained. For DMARC that means the published policy, proof that aggregate reports arrive and are reviewed, a sender inventory, and a record of every change. Keep it per domain, dated, and exportable for the client's auditors or competent authority.

Evidence item What it shows DORA hook
Current DMARC record, captured with date Policy level (p=, sp=, np=) and report destination Art. 9(3)(c)
Policy history When each domain moved from p=none to p=quarantine to p=reject Art. 6(1), 9(4)(e)
Aggregate report receipt and review log Reports arrive daily, someone looks at them, findings are acted on Art. 10(1), RTS Art. 23
Sender inventory per domain Every platform authorised to send, with SPF and DKIM status Art. 8(4), RTS Art. 4
DNS change records Who changed which record, why, when, approved by whom, verified how Art. 9(4)(e), RTS Art. 17
Parked and non-sending domains Locked down with p=reject and an empty SPF record Art. 8(4)
Exceptions register Known failing senders, risk accepted, owner, review date Art. 6(1)

A sending domain at enforcement typically publishes something like this (RFC 9989 syntax):

_dmarc.example-bank.eu.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; np=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example-bank.eu"

A parked domain that never sends mail can be locked down completely:

example-bank-old.eu.         TXT  "v=spf1 -all"
_dmarc.example-bank-old.eu.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example-bank.eu"

Capture the live record as evidence, not the intended one. A quick check with dig +short TXT _dmarc.example-bank.eu or our DMARC checker records what receivers actually see on that date.

For the change records, a simple structure is enough, as long as it is filled in every time:

Change ID:   CHG-2026-0412
Domain:      example-bank.eu
Record:      _dmarc TXT
Before:      v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example-bank.eu
After:       v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example-bank.eu
Reason:      30 days of clean aggregate reports, all senders aligned
Approved by: Client IT risk owner
Verified:    DNS lookup after TTL expiry, first reports at p=reject reviewed

DMARC change management for MSP portfolios explains how to run this across many clients.

09

How should a financial entity roll out DMARC under DORA?

The same way as anywhere else, with the documentation done as you go. Publish p=none with a reporting address, use aggregate reports to find and fix every legitimate sender, then move to p=quarantine and p=reject once reports are clean. There is no percentage ramp: RFC 9989 removed pct.

  1. Inventory domains and senders and add them to the ICT asset register.
  2. Publish monitoring with p=none and rua= pointing to a mailbox or platform the entity controls or has contracted for.
  3. Fix alignment for each legitimate sender, using SPF or DKIM aligned with the From domain. How to handle third-party senders covers the usual suspects.
  4. Move to enforcement through p=quarantine to p=reject, each step logged as a change. RFC 9989's t=y test flag can be used for a cautious step.
  5. Keep monitoring after p=reject. New senders appear and DNS records drift, so report review is ongoing.

How to move from monitoring to enforcement safely has the detailed playbook.

10

How does DORA relate to NIS2 for email security?

DORA is lex specialis to NIS2. Recital 16 of DORA says so directly, and Article 1(2) makes DORA a sector-specific Union legal act for the purposes of Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Recital 28 of NIS2 confirms that, for financial entities covered by DORA, DORA's ICT risk management and reporting rules apply instead of NIS2's.

In practice:

  • A bank, insurer or investment firm in DORA scope follows DORA for ICT risk management, incident reporting and third-party risk, not the NIS2 equivalents.
  • The MSP serving it may be a NIS2 entity in its own right. NIS2 Annex I lists managed service providers and managed security service providers under ICT service management (business-to-business), subject to size thresholds and national transposition.
  • The DMARC evidence is largely the same. A well-run DMARC programme supports both frameworks, which is convenient for MSPs with mixed portfolios.

The NIS2 side is covered in NIS2 obligations for MSPs and NIS2 incident reporting and aggregate reports.

11

Does DORA apply to UK firms?

Not directly. DORA is EU law and applies to financial entities in the EU. A UK-only firm is outside its scope, though UK groups with EU-authorised entities, and UK MSPs serving EU financial entities, meet it through those entities and their contracts. For UK practice on email authentication itself, see what the NCSC recommends for DMARC, which follows the same monitor, fix, enforce sequence.

12

How can an MSP support DORA evidence across a portfolio?

By running DMARC as a documented, repeatable service rather than a one-off project. The same report review, change process and evidence pack can serve every financial-sector client, with per-client separation so one client's data never appears in another's evidence.

DMARC AI is a multi-tenant DMARC platform for MSPs. It parses aggregate (RUA) reports for every client domain, and its AI assistant works on that report data with live DNS access, which helps when preparing a point-in-time view of a client's domains. It does not use DMARC failure reports for AI. It is a monitoring and analysis tool, not a DORA compliance product, and the entity's own framework remains the place where evidence is assessed. See DMARC for MSPs for how it fits a managed service.

13

FAQ

Is DMARC mandatory under DORA?

No. DORA and its technical standards do not name DMARC or any email protocol. They require protection of the authenticity and integrity of data, anomaly detection, change management and third-party risk management. DMARC at enforcement, with monitored reports, is one well-established way to show those controls exist for email domains.

Since when does DORA apply?

DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, was signed on 14 December 2022, published in the Official Journal on 27 December 2022, and applies from 17 January 2025 under Article 64. The RTS on ICT risk management framework, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, was adopted on 13 March 2024.

Do financial entities need to list their DMARC provider in the DORA register of information?

The register under Article 28(3) covers all contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services with ICT third-party service providers. A DMARC monitoring platform or an MSP managing DNS and email authentication provides ICT services, so it normally belongs there. The financial entity decides how to classify it.

It depends on the classification criteria in Article 18 and the related technical standards, applied by the financial entity. DMARC aggregate reports can help detect such a campaign and size it, which feeds the entity's incident management process under Article 17. The classification decision stays with the entity.

Does DORA replace NIS2 for financial entities?

For financial entities in DORA's scope, yes for ICT risk management, incident reporting and supervision: DORA is lex specialis to NIS2 (DORA recital 16, Article 1(2); NIS2 recital 28). The MSPs and other providers serving them can still fall under NIS2 themselves.

14

Final thoughts

DORA does not tell anyone to publish a DMARC record, and articles that claim it does are overstating the text. What DORA does require is evidence of protection, detection, change control and third-party oversight, and for email domains enforced DMARC with reviewed reports is one of the clearest ways to produce that evidence. For an MSP serving EU financial entities, the job is to run that control cleanly and keep the records that show it.

This article is general information, not legal advice.

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