schedule 15-min read

What Is Email Spoofing? How It Works and How to Stop It

DMARC AI editorial team · Last updated

Email spoofing explained: the six types, what SPF, DKIM, DMARC and BIMI each stop, how to spot a spoofed email in headers, and how to stop it.

01

What is email spoofing?

Email spoofing is sending a message with forged sender information, so it appears to come from someone it did not. The forgery can sit in the visible From address, the display name, the envelope sender or the Reply-To field, or it can use a lookalike domain. SMTP itself does not verify any of these, which is why spoofing works.

SMTP, defined in RFC 5321, lets the sending server state any envelope sender and From header. SPF (Sender Policy Framework), DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) and DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance) were added later to check those claims, each against a different field. This guide defines each spoofing type, shows which control stops it, how to spot it in headers, and how an MSP (managed service provider) locks down a client domain. For the wider set of controls, see the email protection guide and the DMARC guide.

02

Key takeaways

  • "Email spoofing" covers at least five different techniques. Only one of them, exact-domain spoofing of the header From, is fully stopped by DMARC at p=reject.
  • Display-name spoofing, lookalike domains and Reply-To tricks pass authentication. They need inbound impersonation protection and trained users.
  • A message from a hacked mailbox is not spoofed. It passes every check, so the defence is MFA (multi-factor authentication) and payment verification.
  • To stop your own domain being spoofed: inventory, SPF, DKIM, then DMARC from p=none to p=quarantine to p=reject, plus np=reject and locked-down parked domains.
  • Test your posture with the DMARC checker and the spoof test, and read real headers with the email header analyzer.
03

What are the types of email spoofing?

There are five spoofing techniques, plus one case that looks similar but is not spoofing. They differ in which field the attacker forges, and that decides which control catches them. Each cell assumes the control is correctly deployed on the impersonated domain or the receiving mailbox.

Type What is forged SPF DKIM DMARC at p=reject BIMI User training
Exact-domain spoofing Header From uses your real domain No on its own: it checks a different domain No on its own: any domain can sign Yes. Receivers that honour DMARC reject it Indirect: needs enforcement first, no logo on fakes Rarely: the address looks perfect
Display-name spoofing Only the name, such as "Jane Smith, CEO", on a webmail or attacker address No: passes for the real sending domain No: passes for the real signer No: out of scope in RFC 9989 No Yes, the main defence with impersonation filters
Lookalike (cousin) domain, including IDN homographs A different domain that resembles yours, such as examp1e.com No: the attacker publishes valid SPF No: the attacker signs with their own key No: the attacker can publish their own DMARC Weak cue: no verified logo Yes, with lookalike detection
Envelope (Return-Path) spoofing The SMTP MAIL FROM uses your domain, header From does not Yes, if your SPF ends in -all No Only when the header From is also your domain No No: users never see this field
Reply-To trick From may be genuine or a free mailbox; replies go to the attacker No No No: DMARC ignores Reply-To No Yes: check where the reply is going
Compromised account (not spoofing) Nothing is forged. The real mailbox sends Passes Passes Passes Shows the real logo Partly. MFA and payment checks matter more

Two points explain most of the table. SPF checks the envelope sender, and a DKIM signature (RFC 6376) can carry any signing domain in d=, so an attacker can pass both for their own domain. DMARC adds the missing link to the visible From domain, called alignment; see DMARC alignment explained. And RFC 9989, Section 2.2, is explicit about scope: DMARC "can only be used to combat specific forms of exact-domain spoofing directly", and it does not address visually similar domains or display-name abuse.

What is exact-domain spoofing?

Exact-domain spoofing puts your real domain in the header From address, the one mail apps show. The attacker sends from their own server, so SPF and DKIM either fail or pass for some unrelated domain. Only DMARC compares those results with the From domain, which makes this the one type DMARC stops completely at p=reject.

How attackers pick targets is in how attackers abuse unprotected domains, and why so many domains remain exposed is in why domain spoofing is still a major risk. For DMARC's overall limits, see does DMARC stop phishing?

What is display-name spoofing?

Display-name spoofing forges only the friendly name in front of the address. The address itself belongs to a free webmail account or a domain the attacker owns, so every authentication check passes. Phone mail apps often hide the address, which is why this works. RFC 9989, Section 2.4, lists display-name attacks as out of scope.

What are lookalike domains and IDN homographs?

A lookalike, or cousin, domain is a separate domain chosen to resemble yours: a swapped letter (examp1e.com), an extra word (example-invoices.com) or a different TLD (example.co instead of example.co.uk). An IDN (internationalised domain name) homograph goes further. It uses characters from another script, such as a Cyrillic "а", that look identical to Latin letters. In DNS the name is stored in an xn-- encoded form.

Because the attacker really owns the domain, they can publish SPF, DKIM and DMARC for it, and their mail passes. Your DMARC record is never consulted.

What is envelope or Return-Path spoofing?

Envelope spoofing forges the SMTP MAIL FROM address, which later appears as the Return-Path header and receives bounces. SPF, defined in RFC 7208, checks exactly this domain (and the HELO name). A record ending in -all lets receivers fail it. Users do not see this field, so on its own it is mainly a bounce and reputation problem. Why SPF alone is not enough explains the gap between envelope and header From.

What is a Reply-To trick?

A Reply-To trick sets the From address to something that passes or looks harmless and adds a Reply-To: header pointing at the attacker. The user clicks Reply and the answer goes elsewhere. No authentication standard checks Reply-To, so the control is a client warning plus training to check the address in the reply window.

Is mail from a compromised account spoofing?

No. If a criminal logs in to a real mailbox, nothing is forged. The message passes SPF, DKIM and DMARC because it really was sent by the genuine account. This is account takeover, and it powers many business email compromise (BEC) attacks. The controls are MFA, sign-in alerting and inbox rule audits, covered in business email compromise and DMARC. When a user reports mail that appears to come from their own address, our guide to emails from your own address shows how to tell a spoof from a hacked mailbox.

04

How can you tell if an email is spoofed from its headers?

Open the full header and read the topmost Authentication-Results line added by your own mail system. Compare the header.from domain with smtp.mailfrom and every header.d value. If neither SPF nor DKIM passed for a domain aligned with the From domain, DMARC fails and the From address cannot be trusted. That is why a message can show spf=pass and still fail, as why DMARC fails when SPF passes explains.

A spoofed message claiming to be from example.co.uk, as recorded by Microsoft 365:

Authentication-Results: spf=pass (sender IP is 203.0.113.45)
 smtp.mailfrom=bulk-sender.example.net; dkim=none (message not signed)
 header.d=none; dmarc=fail action=quarantine header.from=example.co.uk;
 compauth=fail reason=000
X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: ...;SFTY:9.22;...;CAT:SPOOF;...

SPF passed, but for an unrelated envelope domain. There is no DKIM signature. DMARC failed against the From domain, which publishes p=quarantine, so it went to quarantine or Junk according to the anti-phishing policy. Microsoft's anti-spoofing protection page explains the rest: reason=000 means explicit authentication failed, reason=001 means implicit authentication failed, reason=6xx is intra-org (self-to-self) spoofing, and SFTY:9.22 marks cross-domain spoofing while 9.11 marks intra-org spoofing.

Each type leaves a different clue:

Type Where to look Typical clue
Exact-domain spoofing Authentication-Results dmarc=fail with header.from set to the real domain
Display-name spoofing From: address Familiar name, unrelated address; dmarc=pass for the webmail domain
Lookalike domain header.from Near-match domain or an xn-- label; authentication passes
Envelope spoofing Return-Path: and smtp.mailfrom Your domain in the envelope with spf=fail
Reply-To trick Reply-To: Domain differs from the From domain
Compromised account Sign-in logs, not headers Everything passes; check for new inbox rules

Our MSP guide to reading email headers walks the Received chain and DKIM tags. Paste a header into the email header analyzer to get the verdicts parsed. If the question is a warning banner on your own outbound mail, see why Outlook and Gmail say a message may be spoofed.

05

How do you test whether a domain can be spoofed?

Look up the domain's DMARC record first. With no record, or with p=none, receivers have no instruction to block exact-domain spoofing. Then check that SPF ends in -all or ~all and that each sender signs with DKIM. A controlled spoof test confirms what receivers actually do.

From a terminal:

dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.co.uk
dig +short TXT example.co.uk
dig +short MX example.co.uk

In PowerShell:

Resolve-DnsName -Name _dmarc.example.co.uk -Type TXT
Resolve-DnsName -Name example.co.uk -Type TXT | Where-Object { $_.Strings -match '^v=spf1' }

The DMARC checker reads the same records and flags weak policies. Our spoof test goes further: once you have verified ownership of the domain and an address you control, it sends a spoofing simulation and reports the SPF, DKIM and DMARC results. Only test domains you own or manage under contract. For a quick scan of many client domains at once, use the domain DMARC scanner.

06

How do you stop email spoofing of a client domain?

Stopping spoofing of a domain means authenticating every legitimate sender, then telling receivers to reject everything else. The order matters: enforce before the inventory is complete and you block the client's own invoices. The NCSC's email security and anti-spoofing guidance follows the same sequence: DMARC at none, mark spoof email as spam, then reject it.

  1. Inventory domains and senders. List every registered domain, sending or not, and every service that sends as each one: Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, CRM, invoicing, ticketing, website forms, scanners. Finding every sending source covers the method.
  2. Publish one SPF record per sending domain. Include only services that use the domain in the envelope sender, and stay within the 10 DNS lookup limit of RFC 7208. Choosing the ending is covered in SPF ~all vs -all.
  3. Enable DKIM on every service with d= set to the client's domain or a subdomain of it. Platform steps are in how to set up DKIM.
  4. Publish DMARC at p=none with an aggregate reporting address, then read the reports until every legitimate source passes aligned SPF or DKIM.
  5. Move to p=quarantine, then p=reject. RFC 9989 removed the old percentage tag. If you want a softer step, add t=y: receivers then apply the policy one level lower, so quarantine is treated like none and reject like quarantine. Moving from monitoring to enforcement safely has the checkpoints.
  6. Add np=reject. This RFC 9989 tag (Section 4.7) sets policy for non-existent subdomains, so attackers cannot invent invoices.example.co.uk. If np is absent, sp applies, and then p. See the np tag.
  7. Lock down parked domains. Publish an SPF record of v=spf1 -all, a null MX record as defined in RFC 7505, and DMARC at p=reject. Should parked domains have a DMARC record? covers the details.

The finished records for a Microsoft 365 client and one parked domain:

example.co.uk.          3600 IN TXT "v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all"
_dmarc.example.co.uk.   3600 IN TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; np=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.co.uk"

example-old.co.uk.         3600 IN MX  0 .
example-old.co.uk.         3600 IN TXT "v=spf1 -all"
_dmarc.example-old.co.uk.  3600 IN TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.co.uk"

Sending a parked domain's reports to another domain needs an external report authorisation record.

Where does BIMI fit?

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) shows a verified logo next to authenticated mail. It does not block anything. Google's BIMI setup guide requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject and a VMC or CMC certificate, so it is a reward for finishing enforcement. See what is a BIMI record?

07

How do you protect users from inbound spoofed email?

Your DMARC record protects other people from mail claiming to be you. Your users also receive mail impersonating partners, other brands and their own colleagues. For that, configure the inbound anti-spoofing and impersonation settings in the client's mail platform.

What does Microsoft 365 offer?

Exchange Online Protection includes spoof protection for all cloud mailboxes. Microsoft's anti-phishing policy reference lists the spoof settings by name:

  • Enable spoof intelligence, which evaluates sender legitimacy from mail-flow patterns. Microsoft recommends leaving it on.
  • Honor DMARC record policy when the message is detected as spoof, with separate actions for senders at p=quarantine (quarantine or Junk) and p=reject (quarantine or reject).
  • If the message is detected as spoof by spoof intelligence, the action for implicit failures: Junk or quarantine.

Spoofed senders you allow or block appear on the Spoofed senders tab of the Tenant Allow/Block Lists. Lookalike domains and display names need impersonation protection (Users to protect, Domains to protect and mailbox intelligence), which Microsoft lists as available only in Defender for Office 365 policies. DMARC in Microsoft Defender for Office 365 covers the policy detail.

What does Google Workspace offer?

Google Workspace groups its controls under advanced phishing and malware protection, in the Gmail Safety settings. Google's admin help page lists five spoofing and authentication settings:

  • Protect against domain spoofing based on similar domain names
  • Protect against spoofing of employee names
  • Protect against inbound emails spoofing your domain
  • Protect against any unauthenticated emails
  • Protect Groups from inbound emails spoofing your domain

Each one can show a warning (the default), move mail to spam, or quarantine it.

08

What should UK organisations do about spoofed email?

UK organisations should follow the NCSC's anti-spoofing guidance for their own domains and use the national reporting routes for spoofed mail they receive. Staff can forward suspicious emails to report@phishing.gov.uk, the NCSC's Suspicious Email Reporting Service, as GOV.UK's reporting page explains. Suspicious texts go to 7726.

If money has been lost, report it to Report Fraud, which replaced Action Fraud for England, Wales and Northern Ireland, on 0300 123 2040. In Scotland, contact Police Scotland on 101. The NCSC also runs a free email security check that tests a domain against its guidance; what the NCSC recommends for DMARC summarises the position.

09

How should an MSP manage spoofing risk across a portfolio?

Treat spoofing protection as a standard control with a status per domain, not a one-off project. Every client domain needs a known DMARC policy, a target date for p=reject, and an owner for each sending service. A routine that scales:

  1. At onboarding, scan every client domain, including parked ones, and record policy, SPF ending, DKIM status and np.
  2. Monthly, review DMARC aggregate reports for new sources and for spoofing attempts against enforced domains.
  3. On every new SaaS request, ask how the tool authenticates before it sends as the client's domain.
  4. Quarterly, confirm the Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace anti-spoofing settings still match your baseline, and that impersonation protection covers directors and finance staff.
  5. Put DNS changes through change control, with the previous record kept for rollback, as described in DMARC change management for MSP portfolios.

The DMARC for MSPs page shows how the reporting side fits a multi-tenant practice.

10

FAQ

Can someone spoof my email address without hacking my account?

Yes. Spoofing needs no access to your mailbox, because SMTP lets any server claim any sender. Whether the forgery reaches the recipient depends on your domain's DMARC policy and the receiver's checks. At p=reject, receivers that honour DMARC refuse mail that puts your exact domain in the From address without aligned authentication.

How do I know if my domain is being spoofed?

DMARC aggregate reports show it. Receivers that send them list the IP addresses that used your domain in the From address, with SPF, DKIM and DMARC results. Sources you do not recognise that fail authentication are spoofing attempts or unconfigured services. Publish a DMARC record with a rua address and review the reports regularly.

Does DMARC p=reject stop all spoofed email?

No. It stops exact-domain spoofing of your own domain at receivers that honour DMARC. It does not stop display-name spoofing, lookalike domains, Reply-To tricks or mail from a compromised account, because those messages pass authentication. RFC 9989 states this limit itself, so pair DMARC with impersonation protection, MFA and user training.

Is email spoofing the same as phishing?

No. Spoofing is a technique: forging who a message appears to come from. Phishing is the goal: tricking someone into clicking, paying or revealing credentials. Many phishing emails use spoofing, but some come from genuine accounts or lookalike domains, and some spoofed mail is spam rather than phishing. Defences overlap but are not identical.

11

Next steps

Check each client domain with the DMARC checker, list which ones are below p=reject, and confirm every parked domain has SPF -all, a null MX and DMARC at p=reject. Then review inbound anti-spoofing settings per tenant. DMARC AI processes DMARC aggregate reports across client domains and highlights failing sources and alignment problems, which shows both spoofing attempts and legitimate senders still to fix.

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